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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 08-1517
                              
SEAN PRESSLEY,
                                                             Appellant
v.
SUPT. C. BLAINE; SUPT. J. MILLER; 
JOHN DOE #1; JOHN DOE #2; JOHN DOE #3;
JOHN DOE #4; JOHN DOE #5; JOHN DOE #6;
H/E B. ANSELL; C/O WISYAUSKI; C/O MCCLURE; 
H/E KERRI CROSS; C/O GIFFORD; C/O SMITH, 
H/E R. BITNER; UNKNOWN PRC MEMBERS; 
G/S S. DELETTO; K. PATTERSON, Fiscal T/C; 
C/O HAWKENBERRY; TORRETS, COUNSELOR,
sued in their individual and official capacities
                                          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-01-cv-02468)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa Pupo Lenihan 
                                           
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 16, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: 18 November 2009
                               
OPINION
                               
     1  Pressley is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy. 
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PER CURIAM.
Sean Pressley, a Pennsylvania prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his procedural due process and Eighth
Amendment rights.  The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.  On appeal, Pressley argues, among other things, that the District Court erred
in entering summary judgment on his procedural due process claims.  We will remand the
case to the District Court.  
In 2001, Pressley was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institute at
Greene in Waynesville, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Greene”).  Between March 29 and August
20, 2001, Pressley was charged with thirteen counts of misconduct at SCI-Greene. 
Following three institutional disciplinary proceedings, he was sentenced to 1080 days’
disciplinary custody in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”).  He served roughly two
years of the sentence at SCI-Green, and the remaining year at the State Correctional
Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Camp Hill”).1  
In December 2001, Pressley filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against
various employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”).  In August
2002, Pressley filed an amended complaint in which he alleged that he was denied
procedural due process at his disciplinary proceedings because he had not been given
3notice of the charges against him, and was otherwise precluded from participating in the
hearings.  Pressley also alleged that he was denied due process when the defendants
deducted money from his inmate account without providing him with notice and an
opportunity to be heard.  Pressley further alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights had
been violated because, for example, he was denied a proper diet, was exposed to
contaminated utensils, and was given dirty garments.   
In January 2003, Pressley sought leave to file a second amended complaint. 
A Magistrate Judge granted Pressley’s request, and Pressley filed his pleading.  Soon
thereafter, however, the defendants objected, claiming that they had never been served
with a copy of the new complaint.  As a result, by order entered February 4, 2003, the
Magistrate Judge ordered the second amended complaint stricken from the record. 
Pressley appealed the Magistrate Judge’s order to the District Court, but the court
affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s decision.  In April 2003, Pressley submitted another
motion to the Magistrate Judge requesting leave to file a second amended complaint.  The
Magistrate Judge denied this request as well, explaining to Pressley that he had again
failed to serve the defendants, and had also failed to attach a copy of the proposed second
amended complaint to his motion.  As before, Pressley appealed to the District Court, and
the District Court affirmed.  Pressley apparently sought leave to amend his complaint at
least once more, in November 2004, but the Magistrate Judge denied that request as well.
The District Court found that Superintendent Blaine, Deputy
     2  In February 2005, the parties consented to having a Magistrate Judge try their case. 
To avoid confusion, however, we will refer to the Magistrate Judge as the “District
Court” when referring to post-February 2005 events.  
     3  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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Superintendent Miller, Hearing Examiner Bitner, members of the Program Review Board,
and D’Eletto and Torrets (who were involved in the disciplinary hearing appeals process)
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Dist. Ct. Memorandum Opinion & Order,
May 17, 2006.)  As a result, when the motion for summary judgment was filed, the only
defendants left in the case were the corrections officers directly involved in the disputed
misconduct reports and hearings.  The motion asked for summary judgment on Pressley’s
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.  On February 8, 2008, the District Court2
granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the defendants.  This appeal
followed.3 
II.
A.  District Court’s Order Striking Pressley’s Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
Pressley first claims that the District Court abused its discretion by denying
his request for leave to file a second amended complaint.  As noted above, Pressley was
able to initially amend his complaint in August 2002, but was subsequently denied
permission to file a second amended complaint on three separate occasions.  Pressley now
challenges the first of these three denials—i.e., the Magistrate Judge’s February 4, 2003
order striking the second amended complaint and the District Court’s February 21, 2003
     4  In May 2007, after the defendants moved for summary judgment, Pressley filed a
motion for relief from judgment in which he challenged the Magistrate Judge’s February
4, 2003 order striking his amended complaint.  The District Court denied relief on the
ground that Pressley had failed to provide an adequate explanation for why he had waited
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order affirming the same.  The Magistrate Judge had granted Pressley leave to file a
second amended complaint, and Pressley did so, but the defendants objected, claiming
that they had not been served with a copy thereof.  As a result, the Magistrate Judge
ordered the second amended complaint stricken from the record.  Pressley now admits
that, at the time that the defendants filed their objections, he had not yet properly served
them, but claims that he did in fact mail a copy of the pleading soon thereafter.  Pressley
contends that the defendants never informed the Magistrate Judge that he had corrected
his error, even though there was ample time to do so before the Magistrate Judge ruled on
their objections.   
Even assuming, however, that the District Court was, as Pressley alleges,
ill-informed as to whether he had eventually effected service, he has not demonstrated
how he was prejudiced by the Court’s error.  Nothing prevented Pressley from returning
to the Magistrate Judge with another motion seeking leave to file a second amended
complaint, and, in fact, Pressley did just that.  Although his second attempt was equally
unsuccessful, his lack of success was due to his own error, not the Magistrate Judge’s. 
See Ranke v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., 436 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a
failure to submit a draft amended complaint is fatal to a request for leave to amend). 
Therefore, Pressley has not demonstrated that he is entitled to any relief on this basis.4  
four years to bring this challenge.  To the extent that Pressley now seeks review of the
District Court’s order, we note that he has failed to present any argument in support of his
claim.  Therefore, he has waived this issue on appeal.  See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d
176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).       
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B. Defendant’s Failure to Produce Requested Discovery
Pressley next argues that the District Court erred by ruling on the
defendants’ summary judgment motion before discovery was completed.  Pressley states
that, on June 15, 2005, he filed a motion to compel discovery, which the District Court
granted.  According to Pressley, however, the defendants never produced the requested
discovery.  Pressley claims that he notified the court of their failure to do so during a
telephone conference on March 26, 2007, but that the Court instructed him to save his
argument for his brief in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 
Although Pressley did include an argument on the issue in his brief, the District Court
apparently saw no basis for relief.  Pressley now argues that, because the District Court
failed to order the defendants to produce the requested documents, he was unable to
sufficiently support his Eighth Amendment claims.    
We cannot discern any error in the District Court’s actions.  As noted
above, the District Court instructed Pressley to set forth his argument in his brief in
opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Although he did include an
argument in his brief, he failed to identify the documents he sought, or demonstrate how
those documents would support his claims.  Instead, he simply asserted that the
defendants’ failure to disclose the “requested discovery” prejudiced him “by limiting his
7ability to adequately respond to their claims.”  (Brief in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment 8.)  Without further guidance as to the nature or relevance
of the requested discovery, the District Court had no reason to delay adjudication of the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  
C. Due Process Claims
Next, Pressley challenges the District Court’s order granting the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on his Fourteenth Amendment due process claims.  We
review a District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo.  Pa. Coal Ass’n v.
Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is proper only if it appears
“that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d
828, 832-33 (3d Cir. 2002).  
1.  Misconduct Hearings
Pressley first argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the
duration of his placement in disciplinary custody in the RHU, and the attendant hardships
of such confinement, did not give rise to a protected liberty interest.  He also argues that
the court erred in finding that the defendants afforded him all of the process that he was
due at his disciplinary proceedings. 
In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the first step is to determine
whether the nature of the interest is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection.  See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).  Once we determine that the
8interest is protected, the question becomes what process is due to protect it.  See
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).  
a.  Pressley’s Liberty Interest
Procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a legally
cognizable liberty interest.  For a prisoner, such a deprivation occurs when the prison
“imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).  In determining
whether a protected liberty interest exists, the court must consider: (1) the duration of the
disciplinary confinement; and (2) the conditions of that confinement in relation to other
prison conditions.  Id.  Because of the fact-specific nature of this test, our cases engaging
in this inquiry have reached differing outcomes.  Compare Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d
532, 545 (3d Cir. 2002) (denial of the right to participate in a sex offender treatment
program that was “mandated and promised” by New Jersey law implicated a protected
liberty interest), and Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000) (eight years in
administrative confinement, during which inmate was locked in his cell for all but two
hours per week, denied contact with his family, and prohibited from visiting the library or
“participating in any education, vocational, or other organization activities,” implicated a
protected liberty interest), with Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 645, 654 (3d Cir.
2002) (seven months in disciplinary confinement did not implicate a liberty interest),
Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002) (disciplinary detention for fifteen
days and administrative segregation for 120 days was not atypical treatment in New
9Jersey prisons and therefore did not implicate a protected liberty interest), and Griffin v.
Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706-09 (3d Cir. 1997) (administrative detention, which imposed
strict restrictions on outside contact and personal conveniences, did not implicate a
protected liberty interest).
In this case, the District Court held that Pressley failed to establish that his
sentence of 1080 days in disciplinary custody constituted an “atypical and significant
hardship” sufficient to trigger a liberty interest under Sandin.  In reaching this conclusion,
the Court relied on our non-precedential opinion in which we held that a prisoner who
was sentenced to 930 days in disciplinary confinement failed to state facts, or submit
evidence, showing that he was subject to conditions that met the Sandin requirement.  The
District Court compared the length of Pressley’s sentence to the 930-day sentence in that
case, and reasoned that “[i]f 930 days does not [constitute] an atypical and significant
hardship, a mere five months more does not either.”  (Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008 Memorandum
and Order 19.) 
This analysis does not comport with the fact-specific inquiry required by
Sandin.  As set forth above, to determine whether Pressley endured an atypical and
significant hardship, the District Court was required to examine the duration of his
disciplinary confinement, and the actual conditions of that confinement, in relation to the
hardships endured by other prisoners.  See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.  Instead, the District
Court compared the duration of Pressley’s sentence to that of another prisoner and
presumed that the conditions Pressley faced in disciplinary custody were identical to that
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inmate’s.  This analysis did not meet the Sandin standard and we will remand the matter
to the District Court to conduct a further inquiry.  See Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129,
134-135 (2nd Cir. 2009) (remanding matter for further fact-finding on the issue of the
actual conditions of prisoner’s confinement in comparison to ordinary prison conditions). 
Needless to say, we express no opinion on the outcome of that inquiry in this case.  
b.  The Process that Pressley was Due
In the alternative, the District Court concluded that Pressley received the
process he would have been due had he met the Sandin standard.  It is well established
that “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”  Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).  Rather, due process prohibits the deprivation of a
prisoner’s liberty interest at a disciplinary hearing unless the prisoner is given: (1) an
impartial decision-making body; (2) twenty-four hour notice of the charges; (3) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; (4) assistance from a
representative; and (5) a written decision explaining the evidence relied upon.  Griffin v.
Spratt, 969 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1992).  In addition, the disciplinary decision must be
supported by at least “some evidence.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). 
Pressley submitted a detailed declaration setting forth the events that form
the basis of his claims.  He averred that several corrections officers, whom he identifies
by name, prepared misconduct reports, which he identifies by date and number, charging
him with various offenses, but that he was not served with the reports or the
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accompanying “inmate version and witness forms.”  (Decl. ¶¶ 4–21.)  Pressley further
averred that, when he appeared at the hearing on these charges on April 2, 2001, he
informed Hearing Officer Ansell that he had not received copies of “any of the
misconduct reports, any inmate version or witness forms to marshal the facts, prepare a
defense, request 
witnesses or submit a written version.”  (Decl. ¶ 23.)  
Pressley contends that the Hearing Officer told him that he would be given
copies and returned him to his cell.  (Decl. ¶ 24.)  According to Pressley: 
“I assumed that the hearing would be reschedule[d] allowing me
time to review the misconduct reports, prepare a defense,
request witnesses and submit a written version.  Later that day
I received six rationales stating that at the above hearing I told
[defendant Ansell that I did not want to be at the hearing, that
this was witnessed by defendants Wisyauski and McClure, and
that the hearings were held in absentee [sic].”  
(Decl. ¶¶ 25–26.)  
At the hearing, Pressley was found guilty of all charges, sentenced to an
aggregate of 330 days in disciplinary confinement, and ordered to pay restitution. (Decl. ¶
27.)  He avers that, when Corrections Officer Hawkenbery came to his cell to ask whether
he wanted a hearing on the assessments resulting from the misconduct charges, Pressley
said that he did.  (Decl. ¶¶ 28–31.)  Nonetheless, he was “denied an assessment hearing
because defendant Hawkenbery and Patterson falsely stated that I did not want one and a
lein[sic] was placed on my inmate account.”  (Decl. ¶ 32.)  
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Pressley then makes similar statements about a second set of misconduct
reports issued against him, (Decl. ¶¶ 34–38), and avers that:  
“On 7-9-01 a hearing was held on the afore mentioned
misconduct reports at which time Defendant Ansell refused to
allow Plaintiff his properly requested assistant, to view video
evidence and evidence of the names and number of inmates
housed on I-C Pod for the purpose of identifying inmates that I
sought to testify and was likely to lead to my innocence or
mitigate my guilt.”
(Decl. ¶ 39.)  
The hearing was held in absentia, at which time he was found guilty of all
charges, sentenced to an aggregate of 660 days in disciplinary confinement, and ordered
to pay restitution.  (Decl. ¶¶ 41.)  According to Pressley, corrections officers again
ignored his explicit requests for a hearing on the assessment.  (Decl. ¶¶ 42–45.)  Pressley
attests to similar facts regarding a third misconduct hearing, which resulted in a sentence
of 120 days in disciplinary confinement and restitution.  (Decl. ¶¶ 48–53.)  He contends
that he was denied an assessment hearing on these charges as well.  (Decl. ¶¶ 54–57.)
Pressley states that he has been in segregation a total of “seven consecutive
years and some odd months,” (Decl. ¶ 62), although it is unclear how much of that time is
part of the present 1080 day-sentence.  Pressley notes that he has pursued administrative
appeals on all of the misconduct reports issued against him, and although he did receive a
reduction in his sentence for certain other charges, he did not receive a reduction for any
of the misconduct charges at issue in this action.  (Decl. ¶¶ 59–60.)  
Pressley further avers that, while serving his sentence on these charges, he
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was “housed on an atmosphere of excessive violence where officers used mental and
physical abuse,” (Decl. ¶ 63); was “served with a lower calorie diet than that served to the
prison population which resulted in substantial weight loss of approximately 50 pounds,” 
(Decl. ¶ 65); was “subject to contaminated and unsanitary food service wear resulting in
food poisoning type symptoms of vomiting and the runs,” (Decl. ¶ 67); and that there
were “occasions where he requested emergency medical and dental, however, the nurses
would refuse to come to the unit to assess his ailments which resulted in undue pain,”
(Decl. ¶ 69).  Pressley alleges that his complaints about these conditions went ignored. 
In support of his declaration, Pressley attached a detailed “Conditions
Chart” in which he compared the conditions of prisoners in the general population with
those in the Restrictive Housing Unit, as well as those in the Special Management Unit
where he was confined.  The chart shows the amount of time each population is given for
activities like exercise, employment, library access, and education, and describes the
procedures for meals, showers, phone calls, visitors, cell cleaning and health care.  The
chart also includes other aspects of prison life such as access to the commissary, cable,
haircuts, and association with others.  Pressley also submitted a declaration of disputed
facts in which he recites most of the statements in his declaration.  
The District Court entered judgment in favor of the defendants on these
claims on the ground that Pressley failed to “identify how he was prejudiced in his ability
to provide a defense by the alleged failure to receive advance written notice of the
charges.” (Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008 Memorandum and Order 23.)  However, the court did
     5  In their brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants
argued that Pressley’s due process claim was governed by this Court’s decision in Shoats
v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000), which, as discussed below, concerns post-hearing
review of administrative—not disciplinary—placements.  As a result, the defendants did
not specifically dispute Pressley’s account of what took place at his disciplinary hearings. 
That said, the defendants did set forth facts in their Statement of Undisputed Facts that
created questions of fact precluding summary judgment.  
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not address any of Pressley’s other allegations.  Given that Pressley set forth several facts
that, if proven at trial, might establish a violation of his due process rights under Wolff,
and given that the defendants disputed many of these facts, summary judgment was not
appropriate.5
To the extent that the District Court relied on our decision in Shoats v.
Horn, it was error to do so.  Shoats held that a prisoner who was placed in administrative
confinement for eight years was afforded all the process he was due because an
“‘informal, nonadversary review’ at which the prisoner has the opportunity to state his
views satisfies the requirements of due process.”  Id. at 144 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms,
459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983)).  Relying on this case, the District Court found that, even
assuming that Pressley did not receive the protections owed to him under Wolff, “he can
show no [due process] violation because he received regular periodic reviews by the
Program Review Committee (PRC).”  (Dist. Ct. Feb. 8, 2008 Memorandum and Order
23.)  However, the minimal procedures outlined in Hewitt are sufficient only if the
restraint is for administrative—rather than disciplinary—reasons; if the restraint is
imposed for disciplinary reasons, the procedures required by Wolff apply.  Stevenson v.
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Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 70–71 (3d Cir. 2007).  Therefore, whether Pressley received
periodic reviews by the PRC was not relevant to the due process inquiry.    
  2.  Assessment Hearings
Finally, Pressley challenges the District Court’s entry of summary judgment
on his property interest claim.  In his amended complaint, Pressley alleged that he was
denied due process when the defendants deducted money from his inmate account (as
restitution for his alleged destruction of government property) without providing him an
opportunity to be heard.  Specifically, he contends that one of the defendant corrections
officers said that if Pressley wished to attend his assessment hearings he had to sign a
form.  However, he refused to do so because he believed that it was not necessary in order
to obtain a hearing.  According to the defendants, however, if Pressley wished to attend
the hearings, he was required to sign the Notice of Assessments delivered to him in the
space provided for this purpose.  See DOC Policy 1.7.5 ¶ VI.B.1.d (Dkt # 129-2, p. 2.) 
Because he did not do so, the hearings proceeded without him.   
The District Court recognized that Pressley had a property interest in the
funds held in his prison account, see Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 2002),
but entered judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that Pressley was afforded
all the process that he was due because they complied with DOC procedures and gave
him an opportunity to request a hearing.  While Pressley argues that his oral  request
should have been sufficient, he does not contest the fact that he refused to sign the
     6 Although Pressley argues on appeal that he never received notice of the assessment
hearings to begin with, he did not make this argument to the District Court. 
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requisite form.6  As a result, there was not a genuine issue as to whether he was afforded
an opportunity to attend his assessment hearings in accordance with his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Therefore, the District Court properly entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on this claim.   
III.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
